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Abstract
Despite the success of modern physics in formulating mathematical theories that can predict the outcome of quantum-
scale experiments, the physical interpretations of these theories remain controversial. In this manuscript, we propose a new
interpretation of existence that we call physical relativism. Under physical relativism, the difference between mathematical
existence and physical existence is clarified, and Wheeler’s ‘it from bit’ viewpoint can be objectively evaluated. In addition,
physical relativism provides a simple answer to the question of why the universe exists at all, and permits us to derive the
maximally biophilic principle, a generalization of the anthropic principle that ascribes high prior likelihood to the observation
of a universe with simple physical laws supporting the overall concepts of time, space and the emergent evolution of life.
1 Introduction
Over the course of modern history, we have seen advances in
biology, chemistry, physics and cosmology that have painted
an ever-clearer picture of the physical processes explaining
how we came to exist in this universe. However, despite all
these advances, it seems we have not made any actual progress
towards answering (with any certainty) the fundamental ques-
tions of ‘why?’ and ‘what is existence?’
Ever since the probing of quantum-scale physics, scien-
tific interpretations of reality have become divided over these
fundamental questions, with interpretations ranging from the
classical stochastic and observer-centric Copenhagen interpre-
tation, to the deterministic and observer-free view promoted
by de Broglie and Bohm, now known as Bohmian mechanics
[56], to the stochastic and observer-free theory of Ghirardi-
Rimini-Weber [23], to various Many Worlds interpretations
[65], such as Ultimate Ensemble theory [64] and even to
Wheeler’s solipsist ‘it from bit’ viewpoint [70].
In other words, scientific opinion has apparently become
a matter of philosophy. Therefore, we begin by introducing
some of the basic philosophical perspectives. In 510 BCE,
Parmenides reasoned that ex nihilo nihil fit, or “nothing comes
from nothing,” meaning that the universe in the now implies
an eternal universe without any specific moment of creation.
This viewpoint was shared by later Greek philosophers such
as Aristotle and Plato, but does not really answer the question.
In 1697, Leibniz [47] asked for “a full reason why there should
be any world rather than none.” He claimed [48] that “noth-
ing takes place without sufficient reason,” now known as the
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), and generalized the ear-
lier question by asking, “why is there something, rather than
nothing?”, now known as the Primordial Existence Question
(PEQ).
This fundamental question, further reviewed in Edwards
[21, p.296-301] and Lu¨tkehaus [50], has been echoed by many
modern philosophers such as Richard Swinburne, who said,
“It remains to me, as to so many who have thought about the
matter, a source of extreme puzzlement that there should ex-
ist anything at all” [61, p.283], and Derek Parfit, who asked,
“Why is there a Universe at all? It might have been true that
nothing ever existed; no living beings, no stars, no atoms, not
even space or time. When we think about this possibility, it
can seem astonishing that anything exists” [52, p.24].
Most physicists and cosmologists are equally perplexed.
Richard Dawkins has called it a “searching question that
rightly calls for an explanatory answer” [17, p.155], and Sam
Harris says that “any intellectually honest person will admit
that he does not know why the universe exists. Scientists, of
course, readily admit their ignorance on this point” [28, p.74].
With that said, modern inflationary cosmology does offer
some powerful insights into these questions. A generic prop-
erty of inflation is that the universe began from a small quan-
tum fluctuation [26, 27, 29, 30, 54, 60] [31, p.129][33, p.131].
According to Vilenkin [67], “A small amount of energy was
contained in that [initial] curvature, somewhat like the energy
stored in a strung bow. This ostensible violation of energy
conservation is allowed by the Heisenberg uncertainty princi-
ple for sufficiently small time intervals. The bubble then in-
flated exponentially and the universe grew by many orders of
magnitude in a tiny fraction of a second.”
According to Stephen Hawking, “When one combines the
theory of general relativity with quantum theory, the question
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of what happened before the beginning of the universe is ren-
dered meaningless” [33, p.135], because, “when we add the
effects of quantum theory to the theory of relativity, in extreme
cases warpage can occur to such an extent that time behaves
like another dimension of space. In the early universe–when
the universe was small enough to be governed by both gen-
eral relativity and quantum theory–there were effectively four
dimensions of space and none of time” [33, p.134].
The notion that our timelike dimension emerged out of a
spatial dimension is certainly controversial, and it is even more
controversial when Hawking argues that, “The realization that
time behaves like space presents a new alternative. It not only
removes the age-old objection to the universe having a begin-
ning, but also means that the beginning of the universe was
governed by the laws of science and doesn’t need to be set in
motion by some God” [33, p.135], adding, “Because there is a
law like gravity [and quantum physics], the universe can and
will create itself from nothing. Spontaneous creation is the rea-
son there is something rather than nothing, why the universe
exists, why we exist” [33, p.180]. In other words, Hawking
believes that Leibniz’s question has been answered.
The flaw with this logic is that even if the mathematics
of spontaneous creation are correct, they are based on the ax-
ioms of general relativity and quantum physics, which are not
“nothing.” Thus, it is not the ex nihilo creation of something
from nothing, but rather, the derivation of a set of statements
describing the universe in the now from a set of axioms. We
should not be surprised to learn that a set of statements can
be derived from a set of axioms, because for any set of non-
contradictory statements, one could find an axiomatic system
that derives all those statements simply by taking the state-
ments themselves as axioms. If Hawking is correct that the
universe can be derived from the axioms of M-theory, then
this is clearly a much reduced set of axioms, but he has done
nothing to answer the question of why those axioms are true,
nor has he shown that they are the most fundamental possible
set of axioms. Thus, it leaves Leibniz’ question completely
untouched.
Most physicists do recognize this issue. Brian Greene
specifically pointed out that modern inflationary cosmology
cannot resolve Leibniz’s question [25, p.310], adding, “If logic
alone somehow required the universe to exist and be governed
by a unique set of laws with unique ingredients, then perhaps
we’d have a convincing story. But to date, that’s nothing but a
pipe dream” [25, p.310].
A theory that very nearly meets Greene’s goal was pro-
posed by Tegmark [62], known as the Mathematical Universe
Hypothesis (MUH) or Ultimate Ensemble theory [63, 64]. As
formulated by Tegmark, the MUH rests on the sole postulate
that “all structures that exist mathematically also exist phys-
ically.” The MUH is attractive because it permits a broader
application of anthropic reasoning, but does not fully resolve
Leibniz’s question because one can still ask why this postulate
is true. It also does not clearly define the difference between
mathematical and physical existence.
In this paper, we present logical arguments (Section 2) in
support of a new interpretation of existence that we call phys-
ical relativism. We begin with a bottom-up logical argument
(Section 2.1), and then show how physical relativism answers
Leibniz’s question and resolves the paradox of infinite regress
(Section 2.2), and finally show that physical relativism permits
us to generalize the anthropic principle and predict, with high
likelihood, many previously unexplained aspects about the ob-
served laws of physics.
Next, we refute some common criticisms of physical rel-
ativism (Section 3); in particular, we show that physical rela-
tivism is compatible with Go¨del’s theorems (Section 3.1) and
observations of quantum randomness (Section 3.3). Finally,
we discuss philosophical interpretations (Section 4) and give
closing remarks (Section 5).
2 Logical Arguments
The first argument (Section 2.1) shows that if the universe has
finite information content, then self-awareness can exist in ab-
stract axiomatic systems, which implies physical relativism.
The second argument (Section 2.2) shows that anthropic rea-
soning is capable of resolving the paradox of infinite regress
and simultaneously answering Leibniz’s question, but only un-
der the premise of physical relativism. In the third argument
(Section 2.3), we show that under physical relativism, the an-
thropic principle can be generalized to obtain the Maximally
Biophilic Principle (MBP), and the MBP explains some of the
most basic properties of our universe such as the concepts of
causality, and approximate locality, with high likelihood.
2.1 The Axiomatization Argument
Any finite system can be formalized into an axiomatic system,
for example by using one axiom to assert the truth of each
independent piece of information. Thus, assuming that our re-
ality has finite information content (Section 3.2), there must
be an axiomatic system that is isomorphic to our reality, where
every true or false statement about reality can be proved as a
theorem from the axioms of that system, and conversely any
theorem of that system corresponds to a truth about reality.
By the principle of explosion, the presence of a single con-
tradiction in an axiomatic system permits any statement to be
proven true no matter how nonsensical [22, p.18]. Some state-
ments about reality are false, so it must also be possible to
prove these corresponding statements formulated in the lan-
guage of the axiomatic system are false, and thus we may con-
clude that the axiomatic system of our reality is consistent.
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Note that this conclusion is perfectly compatible with Go¨del’s
theorems (Section 3.1).
Self-aware life forms exist in our reality. Thus, by the iso-
morphic property, it must be possible to derive self-awareness
as a theorem from the (finite and consistent) axiomatic system
of our reality.
For any theorem of an axiomatic system, there must be
other axiomatic systems that can also derive that theorem. For
example, a new axiomatic system can be found by the simple
inclusion of a new axiom that does not contradict any existing
axioms, or by modifying or subtracting an axiom that was not
directly used in the derivation of the theorem. Indeed, there
are an infinite number of ways to modify an axiomatic system
while keeping any particular theorem intact. Thus, there must
be an infinite number of different axiomatic systems that also
derive the experience of self-awareness.
Still, we take for granted that our self-awareness and per-
ception of a consistent reality is some kind of evidence that
the axiomatic system isomorphic to our reality is somehow
objectively unique in the sense that it is the only axiomatic
system that is manifested by a ‘real physical universe’ or ‘re-
ality.’ However, as we will now show, this assumption leads to
contradiction:
Proof. Let θ and φ be two different consistent
axiomatic systems. Assume that θ is objectively
special in that it is manifested by a ‘real physical
universe,’ whereas φ is a purely theoretical system
that has no physical manifestation.
If it is objectively true that θ is manifested but φ is not,
then this statement must be objectively derivable. Because no
axiomatic system can derive its own consistency, this deriva-
tion must be made from an external axiomatic system ξ. If
ξ is a non-empty set, then it is not truly objective, but if ξ is
the empty set, then nothing can be derived from it. Thus, by
contradiction, our assumption that there is just one axiomatic
system that is objectively special must be false.
Theorem 1. Either all consistent axiomatic systems corre-
spond to ‘real physical universes,’ or none of them do.
The fact that self-aware observers in our universe perceive
a reality implies, by Theorem 1, that either all axiomatic sys-
tems correspond to ‘real physical universes,’ or that our own
universe is not a ‘real physical universe.’ In case of the latter,
physical manifestation must not be necessary for internally de-
fined self-aware observers to perceive a reality.
Either way, the difference is purely semantical, because we
are left with the conclusion that any consistent axiomatic sys-
tem that derives self-aware observers is perceived as a reality
by those self-aware observers. This is what we mean by phys-
ical relativism.
2.2 The Anthropic Argument
Habitability of a planet depends on a confluence of factors
ranging from parent star class [41, 42] and stellar variation
[45], to planet mass [57], composition, orbit distance [35],
stability [46], early geochemistry conditions [53] and many
other factors [37]. If all of these properties were chosen at ran-
dom, without any overall guiding influence or purpose, then
the probability of achieving conditions amenable to life must
be exceedingly small. Moreover, even on a theoretically habit-
able world, when we consider the probability of random chem-
istry interactions giving rise to self-replication and the actual
evolution of life, our assessment of the overall probability of
any random planet harboring life becomes even more diminu-
tive.
Without knowing the precise details of all the chemical in-
teractions that took place in order to give rise to life on Earth,
it is difficult to make accurate predictions as to how small this
probability actually is. However, despite recent observations
of potentially habitable exoplanets [7] and better models of
early biochemistry indicating that life might not be quite as
rare as originally believed [43, p.47], it is only by taking into
account our cosmological observations of billions upon bil-
lions of other star systems that we can explain the presence of
life as something to be truly expected.
By reasoning of the anthropic principle that “conditions
observed must allow the observer to exist,” it is truly only
necessary for at least one of the practically infinite number of
planets in the universe to contain life in order for us to resolve
the mystery of why, when we look around, we should observe
a planet with all the right conditions for life [55].
However, the mystery is still not fully solved, because it
merely illustrates the remarkable tuning of the underlying laws
of physics that permit a universe with the capacity for life.
From the molecular properties of water [34] to the precise bal-
ance between the strength of fundamental forces [18], to the
number of dimensions and the precise values of all the funda-
mental constants, all of which exist in a perfect balance.
As stated by Paul Davies, “There is now broad agreement
among physicists and cosmologists that the universe is in sev-
eral respects fine-tuned’ for life [16].” According to Stephen
Hawking, “The laws of science, as we know them at present,
contain many fundamental numbers, like the size of the elec-
tric charge of the electron and the ratio of the masses of the
proton and the electron...and the remarkable fact is that the
values of these numbers seem to have been very finely ad-
justed to make possible the development of life” [31, p.125].
For example, if the strength of the strong nuclear force were
changed by a mere 2%, the physics of stars would be drasti-
cally altered so much that all the universe’s hydrogen would
have been consumed during the first few minutes after the big
bang [15, p.70-71].
Can we again invoke the anthropic principle in order to an-
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swer the question of why the fundamental constants are fine-
tuned to support life? This second application is known as
the “strong” anthropic princple (SAP) [1]. However, the SAP
requires some evidence that there are an extremely large num-
ber (perhaps infinite) of different universes having different
parameters for the physical constants.
It is believed by some that the modern incarnation of su-
perstring theory known as M-theory [19] satisfies this condi-
tion. Under M-theory, there are 11 dimensions of spacetime,
7 of which have been curled up into some Calabi-Yau mani-
fold [12]. There are at least 10500 different ways to curl up
these dimensions [33, p.118], and each way would yield a uni-
verse with different fundamental constants [25, p.372]. It has
been suggested that perhaps these correspond to parallel uni-
verses within a multiverse [40, p.93], or as “parallel histories”
of this universe [33, p.136]. Either way, the selective power of
the SAP could then explain why we exist in a universe with a
particular set of fundamental constants amenable to life.
However, this is not the end of the story – even if all the
configurations allowed by M-theory were manifested in some
kind of multiverse, one could still just as easily ask why the
basic axioms of M-theory had been miraculously selected in
order to give rise to a multiverse containing a universe capa-
ble of supporting life. As noted by Greene, “Even if a cos-
mological theory were to make headway on this question, we
could ask why that particular theory–its assumptions, ingre-
dients, and equations–was relevant, thus merely pushing the
question of origin one step further back” [25, p.310]. This
paradox of infinite regress has been pondered since antiquity
[22, p.38].
Physical relativism says that all consistent axiomatic sys-
tems are on equal grounds, and hence the anthropic principle
is empowered to select from the infinite set of all consistent
axiomatic systems, without requiring some arbitrary set of ax-
ioms as a starting point. Thus, physical relativism solves the
paradox of infinite regress, and simultaneously answers Leib-
niz’s question in the simplest possible way: objectively speak-
ing, nothing actually exists.
2.3 The Maximally Biophilic Principle
It was noted by Davies [16] that the anthropic principle “fails
to distinguish between minimally biophilic universes, in which
life is permitted but only marginally possible, and optimally
biophilic universes, in which life flourishes because biogene-
sis occurs frequently”. We now show that, under the premise
of physical relativism, the logic behind the anthropic principle
can be generalized into a more powerful principle that does
select “optimally biophilic” universes over “minimally bio-
philic” ones, and this yields explanations to some very fun-
damental questions about the universe.
We first demonstrate by example. Suppose that there are
just two axiomatic systems that define self-aware life, one of
which exists in a minimally biophilic universe harboring just a
single self-aware life form, and the other being an ‘optimally
biophilic’ universe harboring 1 million self-aware life forms.
For any given self-aware being, without any prior knowledge,
the likelihood that this being is from the optimally biophilic
universe is 1000000/1000001, or 99.9999%.
This logic can be formalized to prove that, in general,
the axiomatic system that describes an observer’s reality with
greatest likelihood is the axiomatic system that defines the
most self-aware observers. Let Φ be the infinite set of all con-
sistent axiomatic systems, and S be the (presumably infinite)
set of self-aware observers defined by all axiomatic systems,
and S(θ) be the set of self-aware beings derived by an ax-
iomatic system θ ∈ Φ:
S(θ) = {s|θ ⊢ s ∧ s ∈ S} (1)
The likelihood of a model given an event (equal to the
probability of an event given a model) is the ratio of the num-
ber of cases favorable to it, to the total number of cases possi-
ble. Thus, given an observer s ∈ S(θ′), and without any addi-
tional prior knowledge, the likelihood of an axiomatic system
θ being the observer’s axiomatic system is given by:
L(θ = θ′|s ∈ S(θ′)) =
#(S(θ))∑
φ∈Φ#(S(φ))
(2)
The anthropic principle states that ‘conditions of the ob-
server must allow the observer to exist,’ which means that if an
axiomatic system θ does not define any self-aware observers,
then the likelihood of θ being the observer’s axiomatic system
is zero:
∀θ#(S(θ)) = 0 =⇒ L(θ = θ′|s ∈ S(θ′)) = 0 (3)
Thus, the anthropic principle is trivially implied by (2).
However, this is not the most powerful statement we can make.
By taking the logarithm of (2), we see that the maximum like-
lihood estimate of the observer’s axiomatic system is simply
the system that defines the largest number of self-aware ob-
servers:
θˆML = argmax
θ
L(θ|xθ,s) (4)
= argmax
θ
logL(θ|xθ,s) (5)
= argmax
θ

log#(S(θ))− log
∑
φ∈Φ
#(S(φ))

 (6)
= argmax
θ
#(S(θ)) (7)
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In other words, even before making any observations,
physical relativism predicts that an observer should expect
based on logic alone that his universe is an optimally biophilic
one. We call this the maximally biophilic principle (MBP).
Because physical relativism tells us that it is possible to de-
rive self-aware observers axiomatically, it is conceivable that
there are some axiomatic systems that derive just a single ob-
server fairly directly. However, an axiomatic system that in-
stead indirectly derives self-aware beings via emergent pro-
cesses such as evolution will be capable of deriving infinitely
more self-aware beings with fewer axioms, and would thus
have much higher likelihood according to the MBP.
It is impossible to have emergent processes without at least
an approximate notion of causality, because without causality
there can be no change. It is also impossible to have emergent
processes without at least some approximate notion of locality,
because without spatial relationships there could be no shape,
form, structure or complexity in the universe. Thus, the MBP
also implies high likelihood for axiomatic systems with space-
like and timelike dimensions, so we should not be surprised to
observe those in our physics.
Finally, we should not be surprised to find that, at the
smallest quantum scale, the universe is not perfectly local
or causal, because there is no difficulty in representing non-
localities or temporal dependencies in axiomatic systems, and
the MBP can only select for local and causal properties inso-
far as they permit the macroscopic capacity for emergent pro-
cesses. Moreover, if quantum phenomena are involved with
the physics of consciousness as suggested by some recent re-
search [13, 14, 39, 55, 58, 68], then this type of apparently
non-deterministic and non-local behavior might be somehow
required for the derivation of self-aware observers.
3 Refutation of Common Objections
A number of overall objections to the MUH have already been
summarized and refuted by Tegmark [64]. Because the MUH
is implied by physical relativism, many of refutations hold for
physical relativism as well. This section will mostly focus
on refuting particular objections to the logical arguments pre-
sented in Section 2; most notably, Tegmark’s own misgivings
about Go¨del’s theorems (Section 3.1).
3.1 Incompatible with Go¨del’s theorems?
Formally, an axiomatic system is called consistent if it cannot
prove any statement along with its negation (a contradiction),
and complete if every sentence that can be expressed in the
language can be either proved or disproved. Go¨del’s first theo-
rem shows that any axiomatic system containing a modicum of
arithmetic power is incomplete, and his second theorem shows
that any axiomatic system containing a modicum of arithmetic
power cannot prove its own consistency [24].
These theorems have been the subject of many confusions
and misunderstandings, as summarized in Franze´n [22]. There
is a commonly expressed fear that Go¨del’s first theorem im-
plies there will always be some truths about reality that can-
not be proven, making it impossible to formulate a theory of
physics that fully describes all aspects of reality. For exam-
ple, in his 2003 lecture at the Cambridge-MIT Institute (CMI),
Stephen Hawking said, “According to the positivist philosophy
of science, a physical theory is a mathematical model. So if
there are mathematical results that cannot be proved, there are
physical problems that cannot be predicted,” adding, “...some
people will be very disappointed if there is not an ultimate the-
ory, that can be formulated as a finite number of principles.
I used to belong to that camp, but I have changed my mind”
[32].
This sentiment was echoed by Freeman Dyson, who said,
“His theorem implies that pure mathematics is inexhaustible.
No matter how many problems we solve, there will always be
other problems that cannot be solved within the existing rules.
Now I claim that because of Go¨del’s theorem, physics is in-
exhaustible too” [20, p.225], and also Mark Alford, who said
“The methods allowed by formalists cannot prove all the the-
orems in a sufficiently powerful system [because of Go¨del’s
theorem]. The idea that math is ‘out there’ is incompatible
with the idea that it consists of formal systems” [36].
However, the first incompleteness theorem does not imply
that there will always be some truths about reality that can-
not be proven [22, p.24]. As pointed out in a response by
Solomon Freeman and later conceded by Dyson, “The basic
equations of physics, whatever they may be, cannot indeed de-
cide every arithmetical statement, but whether or not they are
a complete description of the physical world, and what com-
pleteness might mean in such a case, is not something that the
incompleteness theorem tells us anything about”[22, p.88].
The fundamental confusion arises from the false assump-
tion that for every sentence that can be formulated in the lan-
guage of a system, there must be some observation that an in-
ternal observer could make where the observed outcome is re-
lated to the decidability of the sentence. In fact, it is fairly triv-
ial to prove that this assumption is false (Theorem 2), which
simply means that any indecidable statements that may exist
simply have no relevance to the internally perceived reality.
Proof. Assume there is an axiomatic system θ
that defines the reality of a self-aware observer
who has constructed an experiment with a single
binary outcome that depends on the decidability
of some indecidable statement s that is written in
the language of θ.
By definition, the statement s is an indecidable statement
of θ, so the observer would not be able to derive the observed
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outcome of the experiment from θ. Thus, because θ fails to
explain all aspects of the observers reality, contradiction is
reached.
Theorem 2. If a self-aware observer is defined by an incom-
plete axiomatic system, then it must be impossible for the ob-
server to construct any experiment having an outcome that de-
pends upon the decidability of an indecidable statement ex-
pressible in the language of that system.
Tegmark [64, p.21] has also expressed doubts with re-
gards to Go¨dels second theorem, lamenting that, “Our standard
model of physics includes everyday mathematical structures
such as the integers (defined by the Peano axioms) and real
numbers. Yet Go¨dels second incompleteness theorem implies
that we can never be 100% sure that this everyday mathematics
is consistent: it leaves open the possibility that a finite length
proof exists within number theory itself demonstrating that 0
= 1. Using this result, every other well-defined statement in
the formal system could in turn be proven to be true and math-
ematics as we know it would collapse like a house of cards”.
In order to escape this issue, Tegmark [64] proposed the more
restricted Compute Universe Hypothesis (CUH) as an alterna-
tive to the MUH, which only includes axiomatic systems that
are simple enough to escape these Go¨del-inspired worries.
However, Tegmark’s fears in regard to the second theo-
rem are also unfounded. As explained by Franze´n [22, p.101],
“The second incompleteness theorem is a theorem about for-
mal provability, showing that...a consistent theory T cannot
postulate its own consistency, although the consistency of T
can be postulated in another consistent theory.” In other words,
an internal observer cannot prove the consistency of an ax-
iomatic system that hypothesized to describe his reality by us-
ing the axioms of that system.
The fact that we cannot prove our theories are formally
consistent, or prove that they are fully descriptive of the un-
observed aspects of reality, does not preclude the existence of
a consistent and fully descriptive axiomatic system that de-
scribes reality. Indeed, this result is nearly identical to the way
in which the Halting problem [59, p.173], which shows us that
one cannot write a finite length proof that any computer pro-
gram will halt, does not preclude the existence of an arbitrarily
long computer program that does halt.
3.2 Infinite Information?
One potential argument against the axiomatization argument
(Section 2.1) is that the universe has an infinite information
content, thereby preventing it from being represented by an
axiomatic system.
Most cosmologists believe that there is a finite amount of
energy in the observable universe, with recent analysis of 7-
year data from the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe
(WMAP) estimating that of this finite amount, 72.8%±−1.6%
is in the form of Dark Energy, 22.7%± 1.4% is in the form of
Dark Matter, and 4.56% ± 0.16% is in the form of regular
baryonic matter [69].
However, this is just the observable universe, and we may
still wonder if the universe has infinite extent. According
to the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) model
(or Standard model of cosmology [6]), there are three possi-
ble overall ‘shapes’ of the universe described by the curvature,
Ωk, which can be deduced based on the density of matter.
If Ωk = 0 exactly then the universe is flat and infinite,
if Ωk > 0 then the universe is spherical and finite (and the
curvature also tells us the size [51]), and if Ωk < 0 then it
is hyperbolic and infinite. So far, the data has shown that the
curvature is very close to 0 [44], but this is expected, and is in-
sufficient to determine the sign [49]. Indeed, if the magnitude
of the true curvature is less than 10−4, then it might never be
possible to determine by any future experiment [66].
Regardless, it is widely believed that the total positive en-
ergy of matter is exactly canceled out by the negative energy
of gravity, thereby allowing the entire universe to be created
out of the small amount of uncertainty in the vacuum energy
of free space [31, p.129] [26, 27, 29, 30, 54] [33, p.180]. If
this is true, then the amount of positive energy is necessarily
finite.
In addition, the Bekenstein bound [4], which can be de-
rived from consistency between the laws of thermodynamics
and general relativity [2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 38], tells us that
there is a finite information content in any finite region of space
containing finite energy. Thus, even if the universe did have
infinite spatial extent and infinite energy (contrary to modern
inflationary cosmology), there would still be a finite informa-
tion content to any particular region of the universe (such as a
galaxy). This means that at the very minimum, an arbitrarily
large finite region can be represented by an axiomatic system,
and assuming that self-aware life can evolve in a finite region
of space, then the logic of Section 2.1 would still hold in that
region.
3.3 Incompatible with Quantum Randomness?
Tegmark [64, p.10] has claimed that the MUH is incompati-
ble with true quantum randomness because it is impossible to
generate a sequence of true random numbers using only ax-
iomatic relationships. While it is true that random numbers
cannot be generated algorithmically, this does not preclude the
existence of an axiomatic system that defines behavior which
appears perfectly random based on the limited observations of
an internal observer.
As a concrete example of this, consider the following set
of axioms, which describe the position of a particle having po-
sition X parameterized by integer-valued time t:
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||X(t)−X(t+ 1)|| = 1
X(0) = 1
X(1) = 2
X(2) = 3
X(3) = 2
.
.
.
Suppose that this axiomatic system also defines an ob-
server who, at time t = 2, attempts to formulate a law describ-
ing the position of this particle as a function of time based on
his observations for time t ≤ 2.
It is clearly impossible for the observer to predict with cer-
tainty that X(3) = 2. However, he might come up with the
following theory:
“If a particle is observed at X(t), then X(t + 1)
will be uniformly randomly chosen from the set
{X(t− 1), X(t+ 1)}.”
It is evident that one could construct axioms such that this
theory is validated to be an accurate description of the particle
behavior, and perhaps the best possible description of parti-
cle behavior, over some arbitrary number of observations, de-
spite that the axiomatic system itself has no notion of random-
ness. In this case, the probability represents the observer’s
fundamental uncertainty in being able to predict certain ax-
ioms of the system. Thus, the observed randomness in quan-
tum physics is not incompatible with the notion that our reality
is described by an axiomatic system.
4 Interpretations
According to physical relativism, the distinction between
physical existence and mathematical existence – or equiva-
lently, the difference between reality and the abstract – is
purely a point of perspective. The difference is not that phys-
ical existence is a manifestation from potential truth to objec-
tive truth, but rather, that physical existence is the set of things
that exist in the same mathematical universe as the observer.
A common philosophical question is whether or not our
universe exists in an objective sense without the presence of
self-aware observers, but this type of question neglects to rec-
ognize that the observer is an inextricable part of the universe.
The fact that our self-aware thoughts are capable of control-
ling our physical bodies is already proof that our thoughts are
a part of the physics of our universe. Because physical rel-
ativism holds that all aspects of reality (including self-aware
thoughts) are defined by the same axiomatic system, there is
no limit to the way these axioms may be intertwined and inter-
dependent.
We should, therefore, not be surprised but rather encour-
aged to find a dependence on observers in quantum physics,
because no theory of physics that fails to describe our thoughts
and self-awareness would be complete, and it shows our
physics is on the right track towards unification with a theory
that describes self-aware thought.
To ask whether or not the universe exists in an objective
sense without observers is thus akin to asking whether or not
the universe would exist without gravity or electromagnetism.
We cannot simply remove fundamental axioms from the sys-
tem and then say, ‘yes, it still exists.’ However, if we say ‘no,
the universe does not exist without observers,’ that should not
be viewed as a trivialization of reality in the solipsist sense, ei-
ther. Rather, the people who ask this question are inadvertently
trivializing the degree to which observers play in reality.
Wheeler [70] believed that the physical world was a fig-
ment of the imagination, and that everything physical derives
its existence from the observations made by observers, say-
ing, “... every it–every particle, every field of force, even the
spacetime continuum itself–derives its function, its meaning,
its very existence entirely–even if in some contexts indirectly–
from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, bi-
nary choices, bits.”
This is not the conclusion of physical relativism, because
physical relativism asserts that there is no form of existence
more objective than mathematical existence, and mathematical
existence is not dependent on the presence of observers, nor
is it created within the imagination of an observer. Nonethe-
less, we may agree with Wheeler in the sense that the physical
world derives its meaning and significance from the observa-
tions we make. We might even, perhaps, agree that physical
existence is derived from our observations, but only in the
sense that we defined the term physical existence relative to
the observer.
With regard to Tegmark’s Mathematical Universe Hypoth-
esis (MUH) that “all structures that exist mathematically also
exist physically”, the implication is that from an objective
standpoint, mathematical existence is equivalent to physical
existence. Thus, according to Tegmark, different contradictory
physical universes may exist, and hence physical existence is
relative. In other words, the MUH is objectively equivalent
to physical relativism, although we have defined ‘physical ex-
istence’ as a relative term, whereas Tegmark defined it abso-
lutely.
5 Conclusion
Physical relativism was derived as a logical constraint on the
philosophy of existence, based on the single well-supported
assumption that the universe has finite information.
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Physical relativism tells us that self-aware observers can
exist in axiomatic systems without objective manifestation,
and that the distinction between physical existence and math-
ematical existence is merely a point of perspective: physical
existence is how self-aware observers describe things that ex-
ist in the same mathematical universe as themselves.
Physical relativism is not experimentally verifiable in the
classical sense because it does not make any new measurable
predictions. Rather, it predicts that which we have already ob-
served and struggled to explain: it predicts why the observed
universe exists in a state that is highly tuned to be flourishing
with life, and answers the question of why a universe exists at
all.
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